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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to consider what kinds of 
factors must be taken into account when analyzing the impact of 
military rule on redemocratization in Latin America.
Karen Remmer proposes that by looking at five factors which 
she has identified, it is possible to accurately predict whether 
there will be greater or lesser change in a returning democratic 
system. By applying Remmer's approach to the experiences of the 
1968-1980 Peruvian military regimes one should be able to assess 
the strengths and weaknesses of Remmer's ideas.
The results of this study indicate that although a number 
of important factors relating to changes in Peruvian democracy 
are identified by Remmer, these alone cannot account for the 
degree of regime discontinuity seen in Peru. In applying 
Remmer's thesis to Peru, one discovers that several country- 
specific features must play a crucial role in our understanding 
of Peru's current democratic party system despite Remmer's 
failure to recognize their importance.
THE IMPACT OF THE M ILITARY ON PERU'S 
REDEMOCRA TIZATION
Introduction
Since the early 1980s, Latin America has experienced a major 
shift towards redemocratizaton. The authoritarian regimes which 
established themselves in the late 1960s and 1970s have, for the 
most part, returned control to civilian democratic systems. In 
1980 Peru reverted to democracy as a part of this trend. This 
thesis will examine the impact of Peru's most recent 
authoritarian regime on the democratic system which reemerged at 
the beginning of this decade.
In her article, "Redemocratization and the impact of 
Authoritarian Rule in Latin America, " Karen Remmer suggests that 
by analyzing five specific factors, it is possible to determine 
whether a country like Peru will have been subject to greater or 
lesser change in its returning democratic political system. By 
applying Remmer's thesis to Peru, it should be possible to make 
a reasonable assessment of her work. In a sense this paper tests 
the ability of the Remmer study to explain the dramatic changes 
in Peru's democracy. The first chapter examines the entire 
spectrum of studies on redemocratization in Latin America and 
Spain and the apparent need for more research in the area of 
democratic consolidation. Can a comprehensive study like 
Remmer' s adequately fulfill this need? The second chapter is an 
application of Remmer's ideas at the individual country level.
2
3For the purpose of this study, Peru has been chosen as the test 
case. The final chapter is an assessment of how successful 
Remmer is at accounting for what appears to have been significant 
pre- and post-authoritarian regime discontinuity. 
fi.ag.kgEQun<a
On October 3, 1968, the military seized control of the
Peruvian government and deposed the democratically elected 
president, Fernando Belaunde Terry. The principle reason given 
for the coup was the scandal involving the International 
Petroleum Company (IPC). The military claimed its right to 
intervene due to the "moral decomposition" of the government 
exemplified by its mismanagement of the Brea and Parinas oil 
contracts .1 The Belaunde administration had attempted to mislead 
the public about the existence of some terms which it had agreed 
to in a government contract with the IPC. The government had 
also been involved in numerous other scandals and had 
demonstrated its inability to resolve growing economic 
difficulties.
The new military government under General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado immediately repudiated the questionable petroleum 
contract and proclaimed itself to be the "Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces."2 Rather atypically, the regime
lnBelaunde Deposed in Peru Coup," The TimesfLondon). 4
October 1968, p. 7.
2"Oil Dispute Behind Peru Coup," The TimesfLondon). 11
October 1968, p.10.
4attempted to promote serious reforms in the areas of labor— 
management relations, foreign capital investment, education, 
land reform, and the role of the government in the national 
economy. The regime created "industrial communities" to 
increase worker participation in the management and ownership of 
industry. Links between the workers and the governments were 
created through state promoted organizations like SINAMOS. An 
aggressive campaign of expropriation and nationalization of 
foreign and domestically owned industries was also initiated. 
Many of these expropriations proved to be very popular.
In the area of agriculture, the government redistributed 
a much larger percentage of Peru's land than any previous 
government. Under the Belaunde administration land reform 
legislation had been created but proved ineffective . The Velasco 
government's land reform personally affected 2 million out of 6 
million agrarian peasants by redistributing land to 350,000 
families.3 The real significance of this land reform was that it 
was applied universally. It effected both the smaller sierra 
farms and the enormous sugar and cotton plantations along the 
coast.
In 1975, the more conservative General Morales Bermudez 
replaced General Velasco as president. Near the end of the 
Velasco period, the "revolution" had begun to falter under the 
weight of growing economic deterioration. For example, Peru’s
3Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1987) 316.
5fishing industry, which amounted to one-third of the country's 
foreign exchange, was devastated by an unpredictable shift in the 
Humbolt current. The price of copper, another major export, 
dropped dramatically and oil discoveries in the oriente region 
had not proven to be as abundant as expected. Also, the regime 
had borrowed heavily from foreign banks to finance ambitious 
irrigation and oil projects, thereby increasing the nation’s 
foreign debt burden.
In light of these growing problems, the government 
implemented an austerity program, which resulted in public 
protest and strikes. The new government under General Morales 
Bermudez disassembled a number of the more ambitious yet 
unsuccessful Velasco programs. In 1977, the Moralez Bermudez 
government announced the initiation of open elections for a 
Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly would draft a 
new constitution to insure an orderly transition back to 
democracy by 1980. Ex-president Belaunde's party withdrew from 
the assembly elections , charging that they unnecessarily delayed 
the restoration of democratic rule.4
In 1980 presidential elections were held. Belaunde, who 
had been ousted by the military in 1968, was elected once again 
to the presidency. It looked as if the military government had 
left as its legacy nothing more than continued economic 
instability and tattered revolutionary dreams.
4David P. Werlich, "Peru: the Lame-Duck Revolution," Current 
History 76 (February, 1979): 65.
6On the surface, the impact of the military regime in Peru 
appeared to have no lasting effect on the political system. The 
Peruvians re-elected the same man who had been forced out of 
office by the military when they seized control of the government 
in 1968. Yet this may not have been the case. Merely considering 
the return of Belaunde to power does not tell us enough to make 
such a judgment. Further evidence to prove or disprove this 
assumption must be analyzed in order to determine the extent of 
continuity between the pre- and post-authoritarian democratic 
regimes.
CHAPTER I
Approaches to Democratization
Democratic political systems have risen and fallen in Latin 
America since the 1950s. In response to this phenomenon, waves 
of literature on the subject of civilianization have followed 
each phase of the cycle of authoritarian regimes replacing 
civilian governments and vice versa. A new current of 
transitions to civilian government began in the 1980s. The past 
decade has seen the return of democracy in the majority of Latin 
American states including the recent transition made by Paraguay 
after nearly thirty-five years of authoritarian rule under 
General Alfredo Strossner.
Despite years of debate over approaches to the study of this 
political phenomenon, no definitive theory has emerged. 
Dankwart Rustow called for the development of a single dynamic 
model for transitions to democracy almost twenty years ago. 
Although Rustow made a noble attempt to unify the various 
approaches to democratization, his overall emphasis was toward
7
8the study of lengthy historical phases. Rustow posited that,
The "advent" of democracy must not, of 
course, be understood as occurring in a single 
year. Since the emergence of new social groups 
and the formation of new habits are involved, one 
generation is probably the minimum period of 
transition. In Britain, for example, it may be 
argued that it began before 1640 and was not 
accomplished until 1918.1
The bulk of the literature on transitions to democracy in 
Latin America focuses on answering the following three 
questions: What causes authoritarian regimes to breakdown? What 
are the various paths to transition? What factors determine the 
success of democratic consolidation? Edward Epstein addresses 
the first of these questions in his study of "bureaucratic- 
authoritarian" states. Using Guillermo O'Donnell's framework,
. Epstein concludes that bureaucratic-authoritarian states become 
increasingly vulnerable as they attempt to substitute a new form 
of legitimacy based on economic achievement and hierarchical 
political order for the more traditional role of stability 
maintenance.2 As the memory of past disorder fades over 
time, regime legitimacy becomes based on the its economic 
success. Epstein argues that the lack of economic performance 
in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina is the reason for the
1Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative 
Politics. (April 1970) p. 347.
2Edward C. Epstein, "Legitimacy, Institutionalism, and 
opposition in Exclusionary Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes : 
The situation in the 1980s," Comparative Politics. (October 
1984): 37-54.
9gradual breakdown of these authoritarian regimes in the 1980s.3
Focusing on Brazil alone, Bolivar Lamounier challenges a 
number of interpretations which attempt to link 
redemocratization to economic expansion. Lamounier questions 
the validity of such explanations regarding Brazil's 
liberalization process in the years 1973 to 1979:
. . . discarding the accepted wisdom that
attempts to link political outcomes to the up- 
(or down-) swing of the economic cycle, if for no 
other reason, simply because the more usual 
tendency to link authoritarianism to recession 
and democracy to economic expansion seems flatly 
contradicted by the experience of many countries 
during the last 10 to 15 years. The connection 
between economic expansion and political 
"hardening" in Brazil circa 1968 is too well 
known to require elaboration.4
In "The Economics of the Peruvian Experiment in Comparative 
Perspective," John Sheahan equates the economic failures of the 
Peruvian Military (1968-1973) to similar failed attempts at 
economic restructuring in recent Latin American history . As will 
be discussed in later chapters, the Velasco government's lack of 
success in this area contributed to the eventual 
redemocratization of Peru. Sheahan notes:
3Epstein 1984, 52.
bolivar Lamounier, "Notes on the Study of Re­
democratization," Working papers of the Latin American program 
, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, No. 58. (Washington D.C. : 
1979) : p. 6 .
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What is particularly striking about these 
failures and the breakdown to which they 
inexorably led is their similarity to a basic 
pattern evident during the last thirty years in 
other countries that have tried to restructure 
their economic systems: it is almost as if
Argentina under Peron, Chile under Allende, and 
Peru under Velasco had all been handed the same 
set of unworkable instructions.5
The Paths to Transition
The second question which must be looked at in this 
literature review deals with the various paths to transition. 
Donald Share provides a very useful model of transitions to 
democratic systems. In his article, "Transitions to Democracy 
and Transitions Through Transaction," Share establishes a 
fourfold typology based on two questions. First, does the 
democratic transition have the consent or guidance of the 
authoritarian regime? In the case of consensual transitions^open 
confrontation with democratic opposition is usually avoided. 
Transitions to democratic government which do not include 
support or cooperation from the authoritarian regime in power are 
achieved at the expense of the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. 
These non-consensual transitions tend to be more violent and the 
resulting democratic regimes will likely reject the support of 
political forces associated with authoritarian rule.
5John Sheahan, "Economics of the Peruvian Experiment in 
Comparative Perspective," eds., A. Lowenthal and Cynthia 
McClintock, The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983): 387-388.
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The second question which forms the basis of Share's 
typology relates to the duration of the transformation. Has the 
transition occurred over an extended period of time, perhaps 
lasting a decade or more? Was it a fairly rapid change? Share 
suggests that democratization resulting from a gradual and 
consensual transition is becoming an increasingly elusive option 
for authoritarian rulers to undertake.6 The spread of mass 
communications in the contemporary world makes a gradual opening 
of the political process unrealistic in most cases. Gradual 
democratization which faces opposition from authoritarian 
regimes is the ideal breeding ground for Share's "protracted 
revolutionary struggle".7
Attitude of authoritarian regime 
Pace of democratization (Consensual) (Non-Consensual)
Gradual: Incremental Transition through
Democrati zation Protracted Struggle
Rapid: Transition Transition through
through Rupture: A) Revolution
Transaction B) Coup C) Collapse
D) Extrication
Most modern democratic transitions have been as a result of 
rapid and non-consensual democratization (transition through 
rupture). Share lists four subtypes in this category. Most 
postwar European democracies emerged due to defeat and 
occupation by foreign powers producing a collapse of their non-
Donald Share, "Transitions to Democracy and Transitions 
through Transaction," Comparative Political Studies 19 (January 
1987): 530 .
7(Share 1987, 531)
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democratic regimes. The collapse of authoritarian states in 
Germany, Italy, and Japan all led to democratic transitions. 
Transition through rupture can also lead to extrication. 
Argentina (1983) and Peru (1980) are among the most recent 
examples of this kind of transition. Extrication comes about 
when an authoritarian regime faces a sudden loss of legitimacy 
and, as in the cases of Argentina and Peru, quickly transfers 
power to the forces of democratic opposition. A third subtype is 
the coup. In this situation, the authoritarian regime is removed 
from power by military elites who then call for the establishment 
of a democratic system. Mass mobilization, or revolution, 
constitutes the final subtype within the "transition through 
rupture" category. The most obvious example of this kind of 
transition is the French Revolution.
The central focus of Donald Share' s work emphasizes the need 
for a broad typology of democratic transitions, in order to deal 
with what he sees as a significant number of variations among 
transition experiences . To illustrate this point, he argues that 
Spain's transition to democracy clearly differed from the 
"transition through rupture" scenarios. Spain's transition 
represents a fourth category, "transition through transaction" . 
Special conditions must be met in order to achieve the kind of 
transition which took place in Spain in the late 1970s. Aside 
from the regime’s willingness to implement a fairly rapid 
transition to democratic government, the Spanish regime 
fortunately had the skill and confidence to carry out its own
13
retreat from power. Guillermo O'Donnell describes the 
difficulty in achieving a brief and orderly transition, stating 
that, "This type of democratization poses an enigma that severely 
tests the ingenuity of the social engineers who offer their 
expertise to accomplish a task which amounts to squaring a 
circle" .8
Share examines the specific conditions which allowed the 
Spanish to "square the circle" after Franco's death. Long-term 
conditions amounted to a serious succession crisis after more 
than forty years of rule under Franco and a lack of consensus 
concerning a solution to the crisis. The political conditions 
in Spain were also affected by the political will of appointed 
president, Adolfo Suarez. With the support that King Juan Carlos 
was able to gain for democratization from various sources 
including the opposition, the Suarez government was able to 
maintain enough control over the political situation to 
confidently initiate a rapid yet orderly transition.
Transition through transaction led to the establishment of 
a stable democracy in Spain. However, it required conditions 
which were not present during most of the recent transitions in 
Latin America. When a transitional regime brings in political 
leaders not connected to the past regime, the prospects of 
transaction are increased. If such a regime does not believe 
that its control over reform is threatened by opposition forces,
8Share 1987, 534.
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then the opportunity for a successful transition through 
transaction is further increased. In the end, it requires the 
willingness of capable elites combined with the conditions 
mentioned above, in order to insure that this type of transition 
will succeed. Not all of these conditions were present during 
recent transitions to democracy in Latin America.
Looking at Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil, one sees 
examples of various forms of redemocratization which have 
characterized Latin American transitions in the 1980s. 
Uruguay's redemocratization in 1986 can best be categorized as 
a negotiated withdrawal. The Argentine military's sudden loss 
of legitimacy and abrupt retreat from power resembles Share's 
transition through extrication. In contrast to Argentina's 
hasty withdrawal, Brazil's authoritarian government initiated 
a gradual and deliberate program of liberalization which 
resulted in the return of democracy in 1985.
Transicion v restauracxon democratica by Luis Eduardo 
Gonzalez gives an analysis of the Uruguayan military's decision 
to step aside. Gonzalez argues that the military regime began to 
face significant opposition as a consequence of its attempt to 
create a "democradura“ - a democracy limited by its commitment 
to national security doctrine . 9 Uruguay ' s 1980 plebiscite, which 
would have established the foundations for a democradura. and the
9Charles G. Gillespie, "From Authoritarian Crises to 
Democratic Transitions," Latin American Research Review. 22 
(1987) : 172 .
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prolonged presence of the military in government was defeated by 
a vote of 57 percent to 43 percent.10 Gonzalez points out that the 
loss at the polls severely weakened the Uruguayan military's 
claim of legitimacy. Despite the belief of some in the military 
that the plebiscite represented an acceptance of the status quo, 
George Phillip noted that most Uruguayan officers were 
disheartened by the results:
" . . .  there was a period of confusion and 
conflict; the majority of the military felt, 
however, that it was necessary to replace the 
existing figurehead with a "real" president and 
begin bargaining with the opposition so as to 
maintain as much control as possible over a 
gradual transition to democratic rule."11
Unlike Share ’ s example of transition through transaction in 
Spain, Uruguay's military rulers faced opposition from deeply 
rooted democratic traditions. Gonzalez argues that the military 
made a second mistake by depending on the electorate for support 
and legitimacy. The 1982 party primaries proved disastrous for 
the civilian allies of the military because of a surprising lack 
of support at the polls. The regime also failed to reach an 
understanding with the parties which would allow them to retain 
significant control after open elections. No such guarantees 
were made by the political parties which worked out an acceptable
10George Phillip, The Military in South American Politics. 
(London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 3 50.
nPhillip 1985, 350.
16
transition process under the 1984 Acuerdo del Club Naval.12
Uruguay's transition to democratic rule arose out of a 
triangular relationship among the military, a popular movement, 
and opposition parties. Although the military publicly claimed 
to have engineered the transition and the opposition parties made 
similar claims, Gonzalez points out that no single force 
predominated over Uruguay's redemocratization process. Just as 
the military felt the pressure to meet the publics demands, the 
opposition parties were under pressure not to demand too much of 
the military. As Gonzalez observed,"Popular pressure in terms 
of votes was overwhelming, but mobilization through 
demonstrations and strikes served its purpose as an instrument 
of pressure on the armed forces because it was under control, and 
kept within limits."13
The return of democracy to Argentina in 1983, is seen by 
many as simply the result of Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands 
War. However, the transition which took place in Argentina 
merits closer examination. Andres Fontana suggests in Fuerzas 
armadas, partidos politicos v transicion a la democracia en la 
Argentina that, aside from growing economic instability, the 
Galtieri government also faced increasing dissension and 
disunity within the military as an institution immediately 
before to the start of the war. The regime's decision to invade
12Gillespie 1987, 173.
13Ibid.
17
the Falklands was not only a reaction to socio-economic pressure, 
it was also an attempt to reunify the military.14
As if defeat at the hands of the British was not enough, the 
Argentine public was confused and angered by the sudden defeat 
by the so-called "retreating" British forces. Their government 
had deliberately led them to believe that they were winning the 
war. "The manipulation of opinion was conducted in a masterly 
way: from 2 April to 13 June, helped by nationalist fervor, the 
Argentine armed forces were supposed to go from triumph to 
triumph. "15On June 14th General Menendez promptly surrendered to 
the British at Port Stanley.16 Not only had the military failed to 
win the war, they had also deceived the Argentine public until 
the very moment of defeat.
Fontana describes the military's extrication from 
government as an "unconditional transition". Political parties 
in Argentina did not give conservatives in the military an excuse 
to crackdown on them by mobilizing against the regime, nor did 
they agree to any negotiations ,17 The military was in no position 
to bargain effectively with party leaders. In the end, the 
military managed to retain control only until promised elections 
took place in October 1983. In order to improve its credibility
14Gi llespie 1987,172.
15Phillip 1985, 267.
16Ibid.
17Gillespie 1987, 171.
18
after the war, the military replaced General Galtieri and 
recommended court martials for top ranking Generals Menendez, 
Galtieri, and Admirals Anaya and Llami Dozo.18 Other measures 
which the regime took during its final days were not so well 
received. Human rights violations and the economic situation 
were key factors which continued to damage the reputation of the 
military as an institution.
Brazil's return to democracy is a stark contrast to 
Argent ina ' s transition. According to Share ' s typology, Brazil's 
transition comes under the category of Incremental 
Democratization. In "Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and
Argentina," Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola contrast the 
deliberate liberalization from the top down which took place in 
Brazil with Argentina ' s experience.19 While many observers argue 
that Brazil's transition began in 1974, and continues today, the 
Argentine military proved incapable of prolonging its stay in 
power for more than a year after the 198 2 war. Mainwaring and 
Viola observe that Brazil's ability to limit the pace of its 
transition is owing to its economic successes combined with the 
Brazilian tradition of political accommodation. In the 1970s, 
the Brazilian military was able to claim legitimacy based on 
efficiency and development. Economic growth under the
^Phillip 1985, 268.
19Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola, "Transitions to 
Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," Journal of 
Interamerican Affairs 38 (Winter 1985): 193-219.
19
military's supervision gave the regime the confidence to begin 
the "abertura. ,,2° The authoritarian government was so successful 
at mobilizing support for itself that it was able to establish a 
legitimately powerful pro-government party, despite 
liberalization . Faced with growing opposition in the late 1970s , 
the regime showed considerable flexibility and confidence. 
Viola and Mainwaring comment that between 1977 and 1980 the 
government "responded with notable sagacity and success, using 
a pattern of cooptation where possible and repression where 
necessary".n
In his article,"Entrepreneurs and the Transition process: 
the Brazilian case," Fernando Cardoso argues that Brazilian 
industrialists have played an important role in the 
redemocratization of their country. While critical of 
authoritarianism, they have supported regime control over a 
gradual transition to democracy. Cardoso stresses how 
significant the support of the business community has been for 
Brazil's authoritarian rulers during the last three decades:
^Abertura refers to Brazil's liberalization or "opening" 
process which began under president Ernesto Geisel in 1974.
^Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola, "Transitions to 
Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," Journal of 
International Affairs 38 (Winter 1985) p.204.
20
Without business participation, however, 
the experiment with "enlightened-authoritarian 
trensformation would have been difficult: just 
as before 1964 and in 1968, the more hard-line 
sectors of the military needed business support 
for their resistance to any liberalization (even 
when controlled from "above") for fear that the 
political process might get out of hand.22
Factors Associated with Successful Redemocratization
The third concern of literature related to democratization 
in Latin America seeks to determine, what factors determine the 
success of democratic consolidation. The question becomes more 
complex when one considers that a significant number of states 
have undergone more than one transition to democracy. Success 
is thus measured by comparing reemerging democratic systems with 
pre-authoritarian regimes.
Karen Remmer identifies five factors which affect the 
impact of authoritarian regimes on returning democratic 
systems.23 She posits that continuities and discontinuities 
which exist between pre- and post-authoritarian democratic 
regimes can be accounted for if one examines how her five 
features relate to the authoritarian regime in question. The 
more pronounced these factors become due to the authoritarian
^Fernando Cardoso, "Entrepreneurs and the Transition 
process: the Brazilian case," eds. Guillermo O'Donnell and
Phillip C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986) p.150.
23Karen Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of 
Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," Comparative Politics 
(April 1985 ) : 253-275.
21
regime's direct or indirect actions, the greater the likelihood 
of change in the reemerging democracy system.
Few studies of redemocratization and democratic 
consolidation have been as broad in scope as that of Karen 
Remmer. A greater number of studies have focused on descriptive 
analysis of specific cases of redemocratization in Latin 
America. Much attention has been given to the successful 
democratic transitions in Colombia and Venezuela. Jonathan 
Hartlyn emphasizes the factors which led to Colombia's ability 
to sustain uninterrupted civilian rule.24 Hartlyn sites 
structural and historical experiences combined with political 
stagecraft as the key elements of Colombia's success. Liberal 
and Conservative party leaders in Colombia committed themselves 
to a series of pacts called the National Front, which were 
approved in a national plebiscite and have served as the basis 
for over thirty years of stable democratic government. Before 
the military intervention of General Rojas Pinilla ( 1953-1957) , 
Colombian politics had been characterized by both compromise and 
intolerance.25 While the political intolerance of the bloody La 
Violencia period built strong party loyalties, a history of pact- 
making between the Conservative and Liberal parties made a 
lasting compromise possible.
24Jonathan Hartlyn, "Military Governments and the Transition 
to Civilian Rule: the Colombian experience," Journal of
Interamerican Affairs 26 (May 1984): 245-279.
25Jonathan Hartlyn, 274.
22
Hartlyn argues that successful redemocratizations are more 
difficult now than when Colombia's politicians worked out an 
agreement in 1958. Factors such as the fall of Rojas, the party 
pacts, and their final agreement as to the choice of president, 
lead one to believe that the key to solving Colombia's political 
problems was merely a matter of reaching an interelite consensus . 
The party leaders were not hindered in their efforts by having to 
"sell" proposed agreements to their parties' mass following as 
leaders would have to do today. As Hartlyn observes,
current regime traditions in Latin America 
are likely to face much more severe challenges: 
parties are less likely to develope or old ones 
are more likely to possess a more organized and 
less acquiescent following.26
Terry Lynn Karl also notes the importance of "democracia 
oactada" in her article, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The 
Transition to Democracy in Venezuela."27 Karl's analysis of 
redemocratization in Venezuela focuses on the extent to which 
Venezuela's oil-strengthened economy aided in maintaining a 
democratic system. Much like Colombia, elite-negotiated pacts 
played an important role. The pact of Punto Fijo and the 
"Statement of Principles and Minimum Program of Government," 
formulated in 19 58, were the basis for Venezuela's return to
“Hartlyn, 2 52.
^Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: the
Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," in Transition from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America eds . , Guillermo O'Donnell and 
Phillippe C. Schmitter (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986).
23
democracy. The assurances made by the leaders of the political 
parties in Venezuela meant that in exchange for the military's 
retreat from power, they would guarantee funding for 
improvements in the technical capabilities and economic status 
of the armed forces . Acknowledging that party leaders skillfully 
negotiated a peaceful and lasting transition to democracy, Karl 
stresses that petroleum played a key role in the persistence of 
the democratic system in Venezuela stating that,
In the short run, petrodollars financed an 
emergency plan that calmed the atmosphere during 
the transition period to democracy. In the long 
run, petroleum provided the fiscal revenues upon 
which democratic administrations depended to 
maintain the ambitious, and expensive, situation 
of fomenting the growth of the private sector 
while simultaneously granting favors to the 
middle and working classes.28
Alfred Stephan's comparative study of redemocratization 
also notes that pacts have played crucial role in successful 
cases of redemocratization. He further notes that in Colombian 
and Venezuelan pacts included mutual guarantees, vetoes, and 
purposeful depoliticization. Both Stephan and Karl agree that 
the limiting effect of the Venezuelan and Colombian pacts on 
socioeconomic changes contributed to stable political 
democracy.“
“Terry Lynn Karl, 215.
“Alfred Stephan, “Paths toward Redemocratization: 
Theoretical and Comparative considerations," eds. , O'Donnell and 
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative 
Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)
p.80.
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Having discussed the basic questions with respect to 
democratization and more specifically redemocratization, Some 
attention should be paid to Raul Saba's analysis of the 
development of politics and government in contemporary Peru.30 
Focusing on the period from 1962 through 1980, Saba posits that 
the 1980 redemocratization of Peru was part of an ongoing process 
of political reform which began in 1962. He argues that the link 
between the authoritarian and democratic rulers during this 
period was their reformist attitudes. The thrust of Peru's 
recent political development has been based on a need for overall 
systemic reform. Despite differences in policy emphasis, Saba 
believes that one can trace important continuities in Peruvian 
government since the early 1960s.
Saba disregards the current focus which political 
scientists have taken in this area of study and analyzes Peru’s 
transition to democracy as part of a lengthy historical phase. 
One of the most recent and comprehensive studies of Peruvian 
political development, Saba's analysis looks at the important 
ideological linkages between Peru's reformist thinkers (Gonzalez 
Prada, Jose Carlos Mariategui, and Haya de la Torre) and the 
political events of the last twenty-five years in Peru. Saba 
believes that the key to understanding changes in recent 
democratic and authoritarian governments in Peru is in their 
consistently reformist approaches. He concludes that in Peru "a
“Raul Saba, Political Development and Democracy in Peru: 
Continuity in change and crisis (London: Westview Press, 1987).
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certain fidelity to the principles of reform has evolved since 
1962."31 Saba's study brings out a basic question about studies 
of redemocratization in Latin America. Are country-specific 
factors such as the ones Saba studied irrelevant or crucial to 
our understanding of redmocratization? By using a comprehensive 
approach like Remmer's and applying it to Peru, perhaps this 
question can be partially resolved.
The majority of literature on democratization in Latin 
American concerns itself with answers to questions relating to 
how authoritarian regimes breakdown and the various paths to 
making a democratic transition. Much less has been written about 
what factors lead to prolonged democratic rule. Case studies of 
Colombia and Venezuela may offer some clues. Karen Remmer's 
thesis falls into this third category of the literature of 
democratization and therefore can be used to help determine 
whether country-specific factors deserve consideration in 
studies of redemocratization and the impact of the authoritarian 
regimes. Her study addresses the questions relating to the 
characteristics of and the environment surrounding democratic 
regimes in Latin America. Because questions of democratization 
in Latin America are becoming exclusively questions of 
redemocratization, studies such as Remmer's are increasing in 
their value and relevance to modern Latin American political 
analysis.
31Saba, 156.
CHAPTER II
Applying A Theory of Redemocratization to Peru
The purpose of this chapter is to apply Remitter's ideas 
to Peruvian politics between the years 1968-1980. Remmer 
attempts to predict the impact of authoritarian rule on the 
recently reestablished democracies in Latin America. Before 
analyzing various aspects of redemocratization, however, it 
is necessary to understand the meaning of redemocratization. 
Redemocratization Defined
Certain factors must be present to indicate that ultimate 
power has been transferred to a democratic system of 
government. Beyond simply recognizing the legitimacy of a new 
government, Lamounier adds that a truly democratic Latin 
American state must contain the following: 1) non-
discriminatory political rules, in other words, a single set 
of rules which apply to all political parties? 2) an electoral 
process which contains built-in uncertainties for incumbent 
office-holders? 3) election schedules that comply with a pre­
arranged and permanent calendar not subject to government 
manipulation? and, 4) freedom of the press.1 Mere 
liberalization sponsored by an authoritarian regime does not
1 Bolivar Lamounier, "Notes on the Study of 
Redemocratization," Working Papers of the Latin American 
Program, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, No. 58 (Washington 
D.C.: 1979): 2-5.
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in itself constitute a country's redemocratization. 
Lamounier's criteria take this into account. His conditions 
are based on observations of Brazil's recent transition to 
democracy. During the 1970s, despite liberalization, these 
factors were not a constant feature of Brazilian political 
life. Although gradual liberalization eventually led to 
actual redemocratization in the 1980s, the entire process had 
taken more than twenty years.
McClintock points out that many Peruvians have a broader 
concept of democracy than North Americans. Their definition 
of democracy includes social justice and concern for the 
public welfare while North Americans tend to think exclusively 
in terms of free elections and liberty. In her survey of 
Peruvian coastal cooperatives, McClintock found 60 percent of 
the respondents believed "democracy" meant the government's 
concern for people and social justice.2 McClintock also noted 
that the use of democratic procedures was not a major concern 
of many Lima citizens, surveyed in 1983, when assessing 
presidential performance. In the survey, military president 
Velasco Alvarado topped the list of best presidents since 
1950.3
2Cynthia McClintock, "The Prospects for Democratic 
Consolidation in a 'least likely' Case," Comparative Politics 
21 (January 1989) 142.
3Ibid.
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Although using such a broad definition of democracy might 
lead to some interesting conclusions about Peruvian democratic 
rule in Peru, Remmer chooses to accept a more traditional 
definition of democracy for her study. Remmer's theory of 
redemocratization in Latin America focuses on factors leading 
to discontinuity between pre- and postauthoritarian regimes. 
Remmer identifies five variables used to examine a given 
country: (1) the strength of democratic traditions before the
authoritarian rulers came to power; (2) the duration of the 
regime's stay in power? (3) electoral growth rates during the 
non-democratic period? (4) the levels of repression? and (5) 
the regime's capacity to mobilize support for itself. By 
examining the extent to which these variables exist, Remmer 
posits that one can determine whether significant changes have 
taken place within the returning democratic political system.4 
Examining such changes can help determine whether a successful 
democratic consolidation is likely.
Political Instability. Democratic Traditions, and the Peruvian 
Party System
Peru's political history has been one of continual 
instability and conflict. As a republic, Peru underwent 
frequent political turmoil and periodic military intervention
4Karen Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of 
Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," Comparative Politics 
(April 1985) 253-275.
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because of many factors. First, the geography of Peru is 
formidable. The country is divided into three distinct 
regions by the Andes mountain range. Today the coastal, 
sierra, and Amazonian regions of Peru continue to remain 
relatively isolated from each other. Terrorist organizations 
like Sendero Luminoso have clearly capitalized on the growing 
frustration among sierranos that the problems of Ayacucho and 
other parts of the Peru remain ignored by the central 
government in Lima. Second, Peru is divided ethnically and 
geographically. The largest of its ethnic groups are the 
mestizos. a mixture of both Spanish and Indian. Indigenous 
Indians make up one-third of the population. There is only 
a relatively small percentage of Peruvians who can trace their 
ancestry directly to Europe. Peru's ethnic confusion led to 
serious racial tension in the past (the Tupac Amaru II 
rebellion in the 18th century, for example), and has remained 
a fundamentally important issue for modern Peruvian society. 
Third, recurring economic crises have threatened Peru's 
ability to maintain sound economic policies. Peru has 
continually experienced the effects of boom and bust 
economies, from the guano trade in the 1860s to the fishing 
industry bust in the 1970s. In both of these cases the 
Peruvian economy (which became highly dependent on these 
products for export earnings), failed to become sufficiently 
diversified and was severely crippled as markets and resources 
dried up. Peruvian governments have also frequently saddled
30
themselves with foreign debt. Today, debt mismanagement 
continues to cause problems in the economy. Dependency 
theorists suggest that Peru*s economic instability is caused 
by the effects of its dependent relationship with the 
developed world.5 Regardless of who or what is to blame,
X
economics has been linked very closely to political 
instability and the absence of institutionalized democratic 
processes.
Coupled with economic factors, the very nature of party 
politics has contributed to the instability of the political 
system. David Easton suggests that political parties in Third 
World countries like Peru inhibit progress toward political 
stability and tolerance by acting more as the agents of demand 
than of support.6 Political parties such as APRA and Accion 
Popular have done this by failing to demonstrate consistent 
ideological foundations. They are, instead, fueled by 
uncompromising broad-based emotional and nationalistic issues. 
The lack of stable party politics which was apparent before 
the Velasco coup remains a problem today. The dramatic shifts
5For a good overview of dependency theory see: Gabriel 
Palma, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a 
Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of 
Underdevelopment," World Development (1978) 881-924. For a 
discussion of the impact of the foreign debt on democracies 
in Latin America see: Debt and Democracy in Latin America. 
Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman (eds), (Boulder, Co: 
Westview Press, 1989).
6David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political 
Systems," World Politics 9 (April 1957) 383-400.
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in percentages of votes which Peru's four leading parties 
received in the 1978, 1980, and 1985, national elections
clearly illustrate a continuing lack of party loyalties and 
clear ideological positions.
Table 2.1
Electoral Tallies 1978, 1980, and 1985 (percentages of valid vote)^
1978 1980 1985
Constituent Assembly Presidential Presidential 
Accion Popular N.A. 45 7
APRA 35 27 53
Izquierda Unida (United Left) 29 14 25
Partido Popular Cristiano 24 10 12
Other 12 4 3
The continued existence of Peru's larger parties has 
depended on the success and charisma of their personalistic 
leadership. The APRA party is the only political party which 
has shown resilience in spite of its long-term association 
with a single political figure. With the election of 
president Alan Garcia in 1985, APRA became the only party in 
history to make a successful transfer of leadership from one 
generation to the next. The Accion Popular party (AP) which 
won presidential elections in 1964 and 1980, is so closely 
linked to its only successful presidential candidate, Belaunde 
Terry, that it would be nearly impossible for AP to field 
another candidate capable of overshadowing the reputation and
7McClintock, 131.
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personality of Belaunde. Belaunde's Accion Popular has 
recently formed a coalition with the conservative PPC party 
of Luis Bedoya. The two parties hope to win the 1990 
presidential elections with internationally acclaimed novelist 
Mario Vargas Llosa as their candidate. The two parties have 
worked together in the past. Bedoya's Party formed an 
alliance in congress with AP from 1980-1985. Until now, PPC 
has always run its own candidates during elections. PPC has 
never captured more than 20 percent of votes cast in a 
national election due to its lack of organization outside of 
the Lima area.8 The pact-building which is taking place 
between the two parties is a positive step toward democratic 
institutionalization, evident by both the Colombian and 
Venezuelan cases of redemocratization. Unfortunately, 
Peruvian political parties both before and after the 1968 coup 
have shown a continuing lack of deep party loyalties. Then, 
as now, successful parties have been vague in their ideologies 
and have offered no clearly definable alternatives.
Remmer suggests that a lack of strong democratic 
traditions enhances the likelihood of change. In general, the 
democratic system had not yet been firmly established by the 
time of Belaunde's election in 1963, according to Ratings in 
the Fitzgibbon-Johnson index on "The U.S. View of Political
8Henry Deitz, "Electoral Politics in Peru: 1978-1986," 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 12 (1986) 
146.
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Democracy" in Latin America. The index ranked Peru as 13th 
out of 20 Latin American countries for the period between 1945 
and 1965.9 The categories included in the survey were free 
speech, free elections, free party organizations, independent 
judiciary systems, and civilian supremacy over the military.10
The absence of a stable party system before 1968 
indicates that Peruvian democracy was indeed vulnerable to 
changes resulting from military rule. These changes are 
discussed later in this chapter. In Colombia and Venezuela, 
the strength and durability of their partisan politics did not 
permit brief military interventions in the 1950s to 
permanently alter the political landscape. Peruvian parties 
of the 1960s did not demonstrate characteristics which would 
be likely to shelter the pre-coup political system until the 
military stepped down from power in 1980.
The Duration Authoritarian Rule
A second factor which Remmer suggests relates to change 
in Peru's postauthoritarian democracy is the duration of the 
military's rule. The military governed Peru from 1968 until 
democratic elections were completed in 1980. During this 
twelve year period, significant changes occurred which 
affected the newly emerging democratic system. Peru, like
9James W. Wilkie, David E. Lorey, and Enrique Ochoa eds.,
Statistical Abstract of Latin America. 28 (Los Angeles: UCLA 
Latin American Center Publications, 1988): p.198.
10Ibid.
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many other underdeveloped countries, has been characterized 
by rapid population growth. Between 1963 and 1980, the 
population of Peru increased from 10.93 million to 17.30 
million people.11 Greater urbanization was also notable during 
military rule. The capital city of Lima more than doubled its 
population, expanding from 2.5 million in 1970 to 5 million 
by 1984.12 Not only had the population risen dramatically 
during these twelve years, it was also becoming more 
concentrated in urban areas which were highly accessible to 
national party politicking. Rapid growth under authoritarian 
rule created the obvious potential for a new generation to 
come of age without democratic socialization. As a result, 
such a long period of military rule severely curtails the 
legitimacy of political parties. A decade of political 
inactivity would certainly weaken parties without deeply 
committed memberships. Past stagnation of this kind has led 
to the eventual demise of some parties and the emergence of 
new ones, as democracy returned.
Twelve years of military rule affected Peru's political 
parties in other ways as well. It closed opportunities for 
new political figures to rise through the ranks of established 
parties while safe-guarding the preeminence of aging party 
leaders. The extended political career of Belaunde, which
11Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa. 80.
12Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa. 94.
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stretched across three decades of national politics, is among 
the most obvious examples of a prolonged political career. 
Consequently, the life of Belaunde's Accion Popular party was 
also extended. It should be noted that the political 
resilience of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre for more than five 
decades resulted, in part, from several long periods of 
military intervention between the 1920s and his death in 
1979.13
The APRA party and its founder Haya de la Torre were 
dramatically affected by the Peruvian military's frequent 
interventions. Haya de la Torre had legitimately beaten 
Belaunde in the nullified 1962 presidential election and stood 
a good chance of winning the presidency after Belaunde's term 
was completed. Unfortunately, Haya de la Torre died before 
he had another opportunity to stand for election. The 
military's intervention and extended rule deprived Haya de la 
Torre of any chance at becoming president despite his being 
Peru's best known political figure for more than fifty years. 
The Impact of Electoral Growth
Remmer sees electoral growth as another potential 
contributor to discontinuity between the pre- and 
post-authoritarian regimes. According to Remmer, substantial 
electoral growth makes it less difficult for new political
13Karen L. Remmer, 254.
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organizations to compete with established parties.14 Under 
extended military rule parties are not able to gradually 
assimilate new members into their organizations effectively. 
From the time of the Constituent Assembly elections in 1978 
to the 1980 elections, Peru's older parties were forced to 
scramble for their share of the new voters. Subsequently, 
they were not able to recruit effectively. Prolonged 
population growth and increasing migration to urban centers 
led to significant electoral growth between 1968 and 1980. 
At the time of the military coup, roughly 44 percent of the 
population was 15 years old or younger.15 This suggests that 
more than one-third of the 1980 electorate would have been 
voting in a presidential election for the first time, further 
weakening the chances that the political landscape could 
remain constant.
Approximately 2,041,748 voters participated in the 
presidential elections in 1963.16 In the elections which 
followed the departure of the military, 4,030,000 people went 
to the polls.17 Such a substantial increase in the electorate 
strengthens the hypothesis that the democratic system was
14Remmer, 267.
15Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa. 76.
16Magali Sarfatti Larson and Arlene Eisen Bergman, Social 
Stratification in Peru (Berkley: Institute of International 
Studies, University of California, 1969), p.379.
17Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa. 220.
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affected by this factor. Aside from increases in the 
population, other factors contributed to a sizable increase 
in the electorate. As the result of political bargaining at 
the 1978-79 constituent assembly, convened to create a new
democratic constitution, the literacy requirement for voters
18 • was dropped. When democracy was restored in 1980, the
percentage of illiterates among the population over age 15 was
18.5 percent.19 The majority of these people were now able to
vote in elections.
/
During the 1978 election for the constituent assembly,
for the first time in Peruvian history, 18-year olds were
20 • • . admitted to the polls. This lower age reguirement remained
in effect during the 1980 elections. Because of the relative
youth of the Peruvian population, the age group between 18 and
20 encompasses a large block of new voters. Lowering the age
reguirements and changing the literacy laws contributed to
electoral growth beyond normal population growth. The
percentage of the adult population which voted in 1963 was
much lower than in the 1980 balloting: in 1963, only 2 0.6
percent of the adult population voted; in 1980 49 percent
voted.21
18Remmer 1985, 268.
19Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa. 112.
20David P. Werlich, "Peru: The Lame-Duck Revolution,"
Current History (February 1979) 65.
21Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa. 221.
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The effects of an increased number of voters contributed 
to the widening of the political spectrum in Peru after the 
authoritarian military regime stepped down. In elections 
before the military coup, the parties of the Peruvian left 
accounted for only a small percentage of the vote. In the 
1980 and 1985 elections, various Marxist and Socialist parties 
obtained a substantial share of the ballots cast. The 
democratic elections on the eve of the military overthrow gave 
the left no more than a few percentage points. In 1985 the 
United Left party (IU) received 21.3 percent of the vote in 
the presidential elections.22 Because of the abnormal 
electoral growth rate, the left was able to attract many of 
the first-time voters which APRA and the other older parties 
were unable to effectively incorporate. If scheduled 
elections take place in 1990, leftist parties will have an 
opportunity to further strengthen their position. Alfonso 
Barrantes, a well respected United Left leader and popular 
former mayor of Lima, is seen as a serious contender for the 
presidency in 1990.23 
Repression
The use of high levels of repression by an authoritarian 
regime is another factor which Remmer sees contributing to
22Wilkie, Lorey, and Ochoa. 220.
23Kathryn Leger, "Peruvians Worry their Country is Heading 
toward Collapse," The Christian Science Monitor. 22 November 
1988, 9.
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change in reemerging democratic politics. Repressive measures 
such as the suspension of the right to free speech, free 
press, and free organization disrupt the efforts of political 
parties to maintain their contact with society during non- 
democratic periods. Repression in its most severe forms may 
result in the targeted elimination of specific individuals and 
parties. Fortunately, such drastic measures were not taken 
by the Peruvian generals.
Although many of its early moves were quite popular, the 
Peruvian military soon found it difficult to maintain the 
public's enthusiasm for their efforts. Expropriation of the 
IPC and other foreign interests was greeted with outpourings 
of nationalistic pride not uncommon among Latin American 
countries (Mexico's 1938 expropriation of foreign oil firms 
is celebrated annually with "a day of national dignity"). 
Soon much of this initial enthusiasm faded. Other less 
nationalistic reformist efforts by the regime met with mixed 
responses. Because of the nature of military authority and 
the regime's firm belief that it represented the only 
institution in society capable of resolving the country's 
ongoing problems and preventing a civil war, the government 
was often unsympathetic toward those who questioned the 
appropriateness of their actions. The government attempted 
to intimidate its critics by encouraging mass protests in 
support of the military's controversial programs. Existing 
political and labor organizations resented the government's
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attempts to circumvent their influence over the masses by 
forming state supported worker organizations. Clashes between 
the state and pre-existing organizations as well as criticism 
and internal divisions within the military led to the removal 
of General Velasco in 1976. Under the more conservative 
General Morales Bermudez, the opposition was dealt with more 
severely. Several Lima newspapers were placed under state 
control along with various national magazines.
By the mid-1970s (as previously discussed), Peru's export 
base began to show signs of decay. The fishmeal industry fell 
into rapid decline. The prices of both copper and sugar 
dropped significantly and the payment of foreign debt, as in 
the past, became a serious national problem. The Morales 
Bermudez regime found itself in the position of having to 
impose severe austerity measures. An increasing number of 
strikes and protests in response to these measures caused the 
government to increase its use of repression, and to declare 
a state of emergency. During this state of emergency, arrests
oik.
averaged 1,000 per day over 18 months. Constitutional 
guarantees were temporarily suspended as Lima and other major 
cities were placed under strict curfew.
Although the extent of this regime's repression was high 
it did not reach the levels of extreme repression that had 
taken place in Chile and Argentina during this same period.
24Werlich, 63.
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In Argentina the mid-1970s was the era of the "dirty war." 
Repression in that country was so extensive that the entire 
leftist portion of the political spectrum was virtually wiped 
out. The effects of this most extreme example of repression 
continue to be felt in Argentina's recently revitalized 
democratic political system. The Morales Bermudez government 
chose a different course when faced with growing political 
unrest. The government began negotiations with the party 
leaders in preparation for a return to democratic rule.
Did Peru's military repression contribute to significant 
discontinuity between the reemerging democratic system and its 
pre-authoritarian predecessor? The answer is less obvious 
than in the cases of Argentina and Chile. The repression 
which was imposed by the military regime falls evenly between 
the extreme cases on both sides of the Latin American 
spectrum. In relation to Peru's past experiences with 
repressive governments, the military appeared to be quite 
tolerant throughout its docenio. At first, the regime's use 
of repression was very limited. As the number of successful 
strikes and protests increased, the military relied 
increasingly on repressive tactics. The decision by the 
Morales Bermudez regime to return to democracy in 1980 placed 
the military in a more traditional role as a caretaker 
government. This eventually eased tensions between the 
military and opposition forces which led to a partial 
relaxation of political repression during the regime's final
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year in power.
Mobilization of Support 
The final factor which Remmer examines is the impact of 
the authoritarian regime's efforts to mobilize support. If 
such a regime can achieve and maintain relatively high levels 
of support from the public, significant discontinuity between 
the pre- and post-authoritarian democracies is likely to be 
greater. To determine whether this factor led to changes in 
Peru's reemerging democratic system, an examination of both 
the nature of the regime's mobilization techniques and the 
extent of their success is required.
The military regime that overthrew the government of 
President Belaunde displayed three major characteristics which 
made it unique in relation to past interventions: an
unwillingness to withdraw from power until it had executed its 
reform agenda, a legitimate desire to implement meaningful and 
widespread reforms, and, a recognition by the military leaders 
of the need for direct contact between national and often 
isolated local governments.25 As a result of the bloody 
suppression of large-scale uprisings in the sierra during the 
mid-1960s, the military had become brutally aware of the need 
for major socio-economic reforms. The military's attempts to 
establish these and other kinds of contacts between the
25Kevin J. Middlebrook and David Scott Palmer, Military 
Government and Political Development: lessons from Peru,
(London: Sage Publications, 1975), 5.
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central government and those isolated from it were a 
characteristic which made this regime particularly unique.
The Velasco government came into power after the 
overthrow of a democratically elected government. The 
military claimed that the abuses of the Belaunde 
administration had discredited the democratic system's ability 
to act as an effective political process. The Belaunde 
government had been characterized by corruption and 
incompetence in dealing with the growing social and economic 
problems facing Peru. The military regime's reformist 
rhetoric, accompanied by the nationalization of some highly 
publicized foreign investments, gave them temporary 
legitimacy. Soon the regime's rhetoric began to call for 
radical changes which would affect the entire socio-economic 
structure of Peru. President Velasco Alvarado stated in 1969:
Almost ten months ago. . . the armed
forces in the first revolutionary movement in 
their history took over the government of Peru. 
This was not just one more military coup d'etat 
but the beginning of a nationalist revolution.
. . the whole nation and the armed forces took 
up the march towards their definitive 
liberation, and established the basis for their 
genuine development by breaking the power of 
an egoistic and colonialistic oligarchy, 
recovering their sovereignty despite foreign 
pressures.26
The regime undertook a serious effort to reform Peruvian 
society, which the democratic system seemed incapable of
26Middlebrook and Palmer, 17.
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accomplishing. It was the belief of the new government that 
legitimacy could be maintained after it was realized that the 
regime was both sincere and capable of initiating equitable 
societal reforms. A study which was done during the regime1s 
early period suggested "the military's political framework 
simultaneously attempts to reorient existing political forces 
and to establish structures capable of incorporating new 
political actors mobilized as a result of socio-economic 
reforms. "27
Through the establishment of a corporatist structure of 
government, the regime expected to initiate reforms with the 
support and cooperation of large agricultural and urban 
sectors of society. Regime sponsored organizations were 
established down to the local industrial and agricultural 
levels of society. The political inputs and support of the 
masses were meant to travel up the organizational chain while 
policy outputs were supposed to travel downwards.
Most of the military leaders publicly agreed that mass 
mobilization and popular participation should play an 
important role in the Revolutionary Government. The bulk of 
the urban and rural populations were targeted as the central 
focus of the military's mobilization campaign. These groups 
were continuously reminded that, "La Revolucion es tuya" (the
27Middlebrook and Palmer, 18.
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revolution is yours),28 General Rudencio Zavaleta, one of the
more conservative military officers and head of SINAMOS in
1974, enthusiastically stated:
The task of liberating the workers should be 
accomplished by they themselves. In Peru the 
Armed Forces have but given the initial thrust, 
nothing or no one can replace the will, the 
capacity, and the responsibility of the 
worker.
Although the regime was able to inspire greater political 
participation by the masses, it had difficulty controlling the 
demands and actions of the new urban, agricultural, and 
industrial organizations that it had encouraged to blossom. 
SINAMOS and the Comunidades Industriales became havens for the 
formation of more unions and increased worker demands. The 
regime’s November 1970 Law of Security of Employment further 
fueled worker unrest because it protected workers from the 
threat of being fired as a method of discouraging 
unionization.30 Consequently, the number of unions doubled
28Henry Dietz, Poverty and Problem-Solving Under Military 
Rule: The Urban Poor in Lima. Peru. (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1980) 23.
29Liisa North, “Perspectives on Development Policy and 
Mass Participation in the Peruvian Armed Forces," Working 
Papers of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, No.22. 
(Washington D.C.: 1978) 22. Translated into English by M. F. 
Plichta.
30Evelyn Huber Stephens, "The Peruvian Military 
Government, Labor Mobilization, and the Political Strength of 
the Left," Latin American Research Review 18 (1988) 70.
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under the Velasco government.31
The military's political mobilization efforts aided the 
growth of both leftist parties and unions. The growth of 
labor organizations clearly contributed to the increased 
electoral strength of the left in later years. Unions have 
been valuable channels through which the left can promote its 
own ideology. During the Velasco years, Communist controlled 
unions such as the (CGTP) were given official recognition by 
the government. The (CGTP) flourished under the government's 
new policies and drew members away from the previously 
dominant APRA worker's organization. APRA began to lose its 
preeminence as the defender of working man. The Velasco 
regime also provided many future leftist leaders with an 
opportunity to gain valuable experience in political 
organizing while working in the expanding state apparatus.
Examples of the legacy caused by greater exposure to 
political mechanisims can be seen in other countries as well. 
A study of Mexican-Americans who became members of local CAA 
boards in Los Angeles showed that the members of the councils 
developed increased political skills. They improved their 
techniques for creating pressure on the government, showed a 
greater propensity towards affecting the government, and 
generally greater political participatory behavior.32 By mid-
31Evelyn Huber Stephens, 65.
32Henry Dietz 1980, 178.
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1976, between 15 and 20 percent of Peru's work force was 
included in the local-level participatory framework of the 
military's programs.33 These experiences have clearly led to 
continued politicization among participants even after SINAMOS 
and the Industrial Community programs were dropped (much like 
the Mexican-American study's findings indicated). Lowenthal 
points out extent of increased militancy among Peruvian 
voters:
A significant share of Peru's expanded 
electorate is militantly anti-establishment, 
in ways that never previously happened in Peru.
Five leftist parties won over 31 percent of the 
vote in the 1978 election for the Constituent 
Assembly, an astonishing gain over the 6 
percent that the leftist parties garnered in 
19 62.34
Problems soon arose with the military's mobilization 
strategy and in the economy as a whole, leading to the 
program's eventual failure in establishing a controllable 
source of support and legitimacy. It was thought by many of 
the newly established political organizations that the system 
was not responsive enough to their demands. The economy also 
became increasingly sluggish. The regime soon faced steadily 
increasing opposition. Despite its efforts to make
significant reforms and systematically structure a support
33Henry Dietz 1980, 23.
34Abraham Lowenthal, "The Peruvian Experiment
Reconsidered," in The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered. 
McClintock and Lowenthal eds., (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983), 427.
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system through programs like SINAMOS. the regime succeeded 
only in re-legitimizing the democratic process by their 
failure.
The military was able to attain a relatively constant 
level of support during early period of the 1970s. As 
problems grew the organizations which had been set up to 
promote regime legitimacy lost their significance and in some 
cases turned against the government. The military's ability 
to mobilize support appeared to be minimal and inconsistent. 
The regime's support mechanisms began to fall apart after 
General Velasco stepped down from power and the Morales 
Bermudez regime reversed many of the previous policies. The 
military's mobilization program led to profound changes in 
Peru's postauthoritarian democracy. Whereas Remmer suggests 
that the key to the mobilization of support is in prolonging 
the regime's stay, it is evident that the Peruvian military's 
strategy directly resulted in creating a more generally 
politicized society.
Conclusions
Examining Remmer's ideas in relation to changes in Peru, 
one sees the difficulty in formulating a comprehensive theory 
of redemocratization is readily apparent. Obviously, not all 
of Remmer's five factors are crucial in explaining why changes 
have occurred in Peru. The factor least relevant to 
explaining Peru's discontinuity appears to be that of 
repression. Although the use of repression by the Argentine
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military left a lasting impression on democracy in that 
country, this was not so in Peru. The remaining elements 
which Remmer uses to determine discontinuity merit greater 
discussion with regards to Peru. The question of the 
military's attempt to mobilize support for itself can be 
linked to several other aspects of Remmer's thesis. In the 
case of the military's docenio. the key to its effect on 
redemocratization is deeply rooted in policies which widened 
the political spectrum. Remmer's thesis emphasizes the 
duration of the authoritarian regime, its mobilization 
efforts, and the extent of repression; dismissing the more 
individualistic characteristics of military governments. 
Remmer states that, "Other characteristics of authoritarian 
regimes, such as the role played by the military or individual 
personalities within them appear far less significant in 
explaining their impact."35 The Peruvian military's rule was 
quite distinctive (particularly under General Velasco), in 
comparison to past military interventions in Peru or, for that 
matter, throughout the rest of Latin America. Remmer's 
comprehensive approach to redemocratization accounts for 
several aspects of the impact of the Velasco and Morales 
Bermudez governments which led to changes now a part of 
Peruvian democratic politics but there is certainly room for 
doubt as to the adequacy of her explanations.
35Remmer, 273.
CHAPTER III
The Impact of Authoritarian Rule on Democracy in Peru:
An assessment of Remmer1s Thesis
Remmer's analysis assumes that by focusing on five 
specific aspects of authoritarian rule one can predict the 
degree of change which a returning democracy will exhibit. 
By choosing any recent return to civilian rule in Latin 
America and placing it in the context of Remmer's thesis, it 
should be possible to make a reasonable assessment of Remmer's 
ideas. In this study, the use of Peru as a test case is guite 
acceptable. Political scholars often refer to Peru as a 
bellwether for political trends in South America. Peru is 
often refered to as a bellwether for political trends in South 
America. Remmer herself cites the 1968-1980 military 
intervention in Peru as one of eleven cases which fulfill her 
requirements for study. Having examined the extent to which 
each of the five factors played a role in changing the nature 
of civilian rule in Peru, an over-all judgment of Remmer's 
thesis is now in order. Here it will be determined to what 
degree Remmer can account for the discontinuity between Peru's 
current democratic party system and the system which existed 
before the 1968 coup.
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The Impact Remmer1s five factors exhibit in Peru
Remmer comments that high electoral growth, the extensive 
use of repressive measures, and the ability to successfully 
mobilize regime support are the most likely foundations for 
significant change.1 Evidence indicates that electoral growth 
was abnormally high for the 1978 and 1980 Peruvian national 
elections. This was clearly owing to the twelve year lapse 
between elections, rapidly increasing urbanization, and 
"institutional changes".2 The levels of repression during 
military rule were neither particularly high nor directed 
toward individuals, a specific party, or ideology. One might 
even argue that the military's increased tolerance of the 
political left contributed to the growth and legitimacy of the 
IU parties.3 Whereas the armed forces had traditionally 
displayed a tremendous animosity toward APRA, they now 
tolerated or ignored APRA's activities. The military's
Karen Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of 
Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," Comparative Politics 21 
(April 1985) 273.
2Remmer admits that the military's "institutional 
arrangements" such as the enfranchisement of illiterates and 
lowering the voting age to eighteen are directly responsible 
for growth in the Peruvian electorate. See: Remmer, 268.
According to a study of officers under Velasco done by 
Liisa North, 26 percent of those officers interviewed 
considered their own political orientations to be leftist. 
See: Liisa North, "Perspectives on Development and Mass
Participation in the Peruvian Armed Forces," Working Papers 
of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, No.22 (Washington 
D.C.: 1978) 13.
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capacity to mobilize support during the docenio (as a factor 
which altered the current democratic system) is a much more 
complicated matter. Saba comments that the military left a 
troublesome legacy for democratic politicians:
The efforts at political modernization and 
integration during the military years so 
heightened the pace of popular awareness and 
expectations that the second Belaunde 
administration was confronted with increased 
political demands from a wider and more 
inclusive spectrum of the population.4
Under the Velasco government, popular mobilization was 
enthusiastically promoted. Because the regime did not 
effectively channel its support, the political left benefited 
from the newly aroused social atmosphere. Phillip argues that 
by destroying the traditional social structure of rural Peru 
the military in general and the Velasco regime in particular 
created the conditions which led to the emergence of Sendero 
Luminoso— the most savage and effective terrorist organization 
in South America.5 Although it might be unfair to blame the 
rise of Sendero Luminoso on the Velasco regime one cannot 
easily dispute the profound and continuing impact of the 
military's political mobilization program. While Remmer 
considers mobilization of support as having an indirect impact 
on post-authoritarian democracies (one which allows prolonged
4Raul Saba, Political Development and Democracy in Peru: 
Continuity in change and crisis. (London: Westview Press, 
1987) 147-148.
5George Phillip, The Military in South American Politics. 
(London: Croom Helm, 1985) 300.
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rule), in the case of Peru, the failure to effectively channel 
this support sparked to significant political and social 
change.
Remmer's points on stable party systems and the duration 
of authoritarian rule are well taken. The political system 
in Peru before 1968 proved to be highly susceptible to change 
due to its weak and factionalized nature. However, this alone 
could not account for the degree of change which had taken 
place by the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections. The twelve 
year duration of its rule enabled the military to have a more 
lasting impact than in previous interventions. The Junta 
Militar de Gobierno, 1962-1963, had only briefly interrupted 
civilian rule until new elections could be held. In contrast, 
the Velasco regime intended on staying in power until its 
lengthy reform agenda was completed. Its ultimate goal was 
to create a "New Peruvian Man".
The Impact of Political Leadership Institutional change
In her study, Remmer dismisses some aspects of 
authoritarian rule which she claims do not enhance our 
understanding of how redemocratization leads to greater party 
system discontinuity. The political leadership and 
institutional changes which have characterized various 
authoritarian regimes are of little consequence to the Remmer 
thesis.6 However, many observers have emphasized that the
6Remmer, 269.
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discontinuities which are now features of Peruvian party 
politics resulted from these same characteristics. The 
Velasco regime was perhaps the most reform-minded government 
in the history of the republic. The legacy of the docenio 
extends beyond the widening of Peru's political spectrum. 
Other consequences of the military's rule include the 
expansion of the state sector and the shifting of political 
power away from the oligarchy. Saba suggests a correlation 
between these two phenomena:
The disappearance of the oligarchy— not 
the ex-oligarchs— is the clearest sign of a 
profound reordering of the social structure of 
the country. As a result of this, new dominant 
groups emerged and flourished, principally from 
industry and from the technical bureaucracy 
strengthened by the growth of a state 
apparatus.7
In order to initiate its reforms (which in turn led to 
the decline of the oligarchy), the military greatly expanded 
the state bureaucracy. A larger state sector not controlled 
by the traditional elites now exists thanks to the Peruvian 
military. The driving force behind the organizers of the 
"institutional revolution" was a sense that civilian 
democratic government was not capable of initiating badly 
needed political, social, and economic reforms. Without such 
reforms, the leaders of the military believed that violent 
social upheaval would soon follow. Under the leadership of 
General Velasco, the military pursued a course of immediate
7Saba, 62.
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and radical reform, passing some 4,000 laws in its first five 
years in office.8
Lowenthal observes that despite the radical nature of the 
Velasco regime's reform program, the military was 
ideologically divided, to which North adds that the political 
orientations of the officers were evenly split between left, 
right, and center.9 How then could such liberal reforms have 
been implemented? The answer lies in the politicking within 
the military leadership itself. For example, the Velasco 
government won over many officers with its generally popular 
policy of expropriation and nationalization. As a further 
consequence, the regime's extended control over the economy
provided non-military jobs for about half of the senior
• • • 10 officer corps, all of whom received double salaries. Also,
General Velasco's initial administrative reforms opened up a
number of new cabinet posts which allowed him to create a
favorable balance between the radical and non-radicals in top
government positions. Lastly, Velasco himself sympathized
with the radical elements in the military yet managed to
appease conservatives by including moderates like Morales
Bermudez in important cabinet posts.
8Abraham Lowenthal, "The Peruvian Experiment
Reconsidered," in The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered. 
McClintock and Lowenthal eds., (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983) 421.
9Ibid., and North, 13.
10Phillip, 291.
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The formation of the Presidential Advisory 
Commission (COAP) , Velasco's personal staff agency responsible 
for vetting administrative proposals, helped tip the balance 
within the military hierarchy toward radicalism. Philip 
states that "this organization, headed by General Graham, 
became the real power-centre of the radical nationalists as 
would become clear in the following months."11 In spite of 
frequent rumblings of dissension within the military, which 
eventually led to Velasco's replacement in 1976, the regime 
was able to initiate one of the most radical redistributions 
of property in South American history.12 The devastation of 
the previously dominant oligarchical class had a profound 
effect on Peru's returning democracy. The decline of the 
traditional elites is evinced in their losing control over the 
media in Peru. As Lowenthal aptly points out,
Most of Peru's former oligarchs have 
fallen from unquestioned authority to oblivion 
or even ignominy. The major newspapers - La 
Prensa and El Comercio - that for so long 
established the limits of debate in Peru have 
been severely weakened, and no comparably 
influential newspaper has yet emerged.
11Philip, 284.
12Susan Eckstein provides an interesting analysis of the 
redistribution efforts under General Velasco in comparison 
with similar attempts in Cuba, Mexico, and Bolivia in: 
"Revolution and Redistribution in Latin America," in The 
Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered. McClintock and Lowenthal 
eds. 1983.
13Lowenthal, 425.
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Remmer admits that institutional changes do not fit well 
into her comparative approach because of the country-specific 
character of such factors.14 Here again Remmer has set aside 
relevant variables for the sake of economy. Her rationale is 
understandable— namely, that "the array of phenomena that 
falls under the institutional change rubric is so broad and 
disparate that comparative analysis is virtually impossible."15 
However, to discount the institutional changes that resulted 
from authoritarian rule under the Peruvian military neglects 
a vital aspect of the military's impact on Peru's democracy. 
The institutional changes initiated by the Peruvian generals 
played an important role in explaining party system 
discontinuity. Such changes enfranchised illiterates, 
lowered the voting age, and impelled agrarian, judicial, and 
educational reforms. Although Remmer is correct in pointing 
out the difficulty in sorting out the effects of each state 
sponsored institutional change, the Peruvian military's 
numerous reforms significantly altered Peru's political 
landscape.
Continuity in Change
The present state of Peruvian democracy is in many ways 
the result of the demands which Peru's reformist thinkers made 
throughout the first half of this century. Remmer's thesis
14Remmer, 2 68.
15Remmer, 269.
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avoids the inclusion of such factors with good reason. These 
too are country-specific considerations. Regardless of this, 
the impact which Peru's leading reformist thinkers had on the 
generals of the docenio offers important answers as to why 
changes have occurred. Gonzalez Prada, Jose Carlos 
Mariategui, and Haya de la Torre were important social critics 
whose ideas were easily identifiable within the rhetoric and 
initiatives of Velasco’s Revolutionary Government of the Armed 
Forces (GRFA). Such themes as indiaenismo. Peruanidad. and 
agrarian reform had been discussed and debated for decades 
before the 1968 coup. A number of Peruvian officers had 
become familiar with these reformist concepts while attending 
the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM). CAEM was 
established in the 1950s to increase the professionalism of 
Peru's military officers. APRA's leader, Haya de la Torre, 
supported its creation believing that the "central idea was 
to give the army a political conscience to protect democracy 
and not destroy it."16
Indiaenismo. Peruanidad and Agrarian reform
Indiaenismo is best understood as the promotion of Peru's 
indigenous culture and its values. Among the first to 
propagate this concept in modern Peruvian society was Manuel
16Saba, 37.
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Gonzalez Prada (1848-1918) .17 Gonzalez Prada believed in 
incorporating the Indian into the mainstream of Peruvian 
society. He attacked the elite hacienda structure of rural 
Peru and was a supporter of the rights of the working classes. 
Gonzalez Prada stressed the importance of realizing the 
cultural strengths and responsibilities of Peruanidad 
(Peruvianity). Through the blending of Spanish and Indian 
cultures, a unique racial mix— the Mestizaie— would bring Peru 
true national glory.18 The Indians needed greater social 
consciousness accompanied by radical structural changes in 
society in order to allow Peru to benefit from their racial 
strengths and values. The Velasco government claimed to be 
working on behalf of Indiqenismo and emphasized indigenous 
culture in urban and agrarian reform efforts.19 The ideas 
of Gonzalez Prada continued to thrive in the social commentary 
of Mariategui and Haya de la Torre. Mariategui expounded 
Indiqenismo and Peruanidad through a Marxist interpretation. 
During his short life-time (1894-1930) Mariategui criticized 
the economic and social hegemony of the Peruvian elites, 
Peru’s dependency on foreign imperialism, and called for the 
complete integration of Peru's indigenous heritage along with
17Saba, 13.
18David P. Werlich, Peru: A Short History. (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978) 143.
19Some obvoius examples are Velasco's Plan Inca and the 
Morales Bermudez Plan Tupac Amaru.
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• • 20 radical agrarian reform. In contrast, Haya de la Torre saw
the problems of the Indians as the result of Peru's socio­
economic structure rather than racial inequalities. Haya 
believed that,
From the extraction of Peru's natural 
resources to cultural and economic domination 
from abroad, the impact on indigenous Peru had 
been devastating. Thus to struggle for the 
Indian was to struggle against imperialism.21
Haya de la Torre did not wish to return Peru to the 
ancient times of the Tahuantinsuvo empire but rather promoted 
the idea of an independent and integrated Peru built on the 
dignity of its unique historical and racial character. 
Education was the key to Haya's plan for integrating society. 
Free night schools for workers called Universidades Populares 
de Gonzalez Prada were established by Haya's Aprista party.22 
APRA's "popular universities" had emphasized the lack of 
educational opportunities available to the poorer classes of 
society.
In the 1950s and 60s the Peruvian military began to 
discuss, and eventually accept, many of the reformist
20Saba, 19.
21Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, Obras Comoletas:
Construvendo el Aorismo/Ideario v imperialista v la Rusia 
Sovietica. Tomo 3. Lima: Editorial Siglo XXI. p. 18-19. in 
Saba, 163.
22Werlich, 164.
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teachings of Peru1s three most prominent social commentators. 
At CAEM Peru's social, political, and economic problems became 
the central focus of debate. Some of the major concerns 
discussed by the officers attending CAEM dealt with the 
following issues: 23
1. National control over the extraction and production 
of petroleum, monopolized by the International 
Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of Standard 
Oil of New Jersey.
2. Defense of the 200 mile limit for fishing rights
3. Promotion of industrialization
4. Establishment of an Institute of National Planning
5. Implementation of regional development projects, 
especially in the sparsely settled border areas 
the selva (jungle)
6. Promotion of "patriotism” and national unity, crossing 
over barriers of class and culture
7. The need for agrarian and tax reforms to assure 
internal stability and neutralize revolutionary 
potential
8. A growing criticism of the traditional oligarchy for 
their responsibility for Peru's underdevelopment and 
its dependent ties with foreign capital
Unlike most previous presidents, General Velasco came 
from a humble mestizo background. Velasco's supporters in the 
military were the sons of the middle classes and almost half
23Saba, 39.
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of them had an association with CAEM.24 During Velasco's seven 
years as president, the goals of the "revolution” called for 
the radical transformation of society. Unburdened by a 
clearly defined ideology, Velasco's Plan Inca reflected both 
nationalist and humanist ideals. The military addressed 
issues concerning many of the same reforms which had been 
demanded by Peru's leading reformist thinkers. For example, 
McNicoll called the Agrarian Reform Act of June, 1969 the 
"most sweeping land reform program since the Cuban 
Revolution."25 The military's agrarian reforms distributed 
enough of Peru's arable land to destroy the economic base of 
the traditional landed elites. In addition, educational 
reform during the Velasco years led to an expansion in 
secondary education with an emphasis on vocational training, 
cost-free higher education, and much needed organizational 
reforms at the university level.26 The effect of the secondary 
education reforms has given Peru substantially higher levels 
of secondary enrollment than neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador.27 
Other programs which were also inspired in part by Peru's 
reformist traditions included mobilizing and integrating
24North, 25.
25Robert McNicoll, Peru's Institutional Revolution. 
(University of West Florida: Latin American Studies, 
Interdisciplinary Occasional Papers, 1973) 31.
26Werlich, 328-329.
27McClintock, 138.
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politically isolated sectors of society, nationalizing of 
foreign industries such as the IPC, and the establishing a 
foreign policy less tied to the United States.
The lasting impact of the military reforms made during 
Velasco*s regime is evident in Peru. In turn, it is 
reasonable to assume that Velasco established his reform 
programs in response to a growing consensus within the 
military based on themes propounded by Peru's most prominent 
social critics. The dedication to these reformist ideals as 
the focus of the Velasco government constitutes a factor 
leading to postauthoritarian regime discontinuity. Remmer's 
thesis does not take in account the impact of the motivations 
behind authoritarian intervention. Unlike most recent 
military overthrows in Latin America, the Peruvian military 
was not merely motivated by a need to maintain the status quo, 
but rather by a desire to implement profound changes. From 
this perspective, it could be argued that the greater the 
dedication to reforms, the greater the likelihood of 
significant change in the returning democratic system.
The Impact of Greater Tolerance
The experience of the Peruvian Military docenio had a 
major impact on the democratic system which followed. Peru 
is currently on the verge of its third uninterrupted 
democratic presidential succession; an unpresidented event for 
democracy in Peru. With the annual inflation hovering in the 
four figure range, recent polls indicate that the majority of
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citizens remain committed to the principles of democratic 
• • • 28political regime. Why is it that despite suffering from the 
worst economic crisis in over a century, Peru's populace has 
continued to place its confidence in democratic institutions? 
Part of the answer may be related to Viola and Mainwaring's 
observations about Argentina's recent redemocratization.29 
Political scholars observed that the legitimacy of Argentina's 
democratic regimes is linked to the public's perception of 
their efficiency. In the past, inefficiency weakened the call 
for democratic alternatives and strengthened arguments for 
military intervention. For many Argentines, democracy was 
becoming synonymous with governmental impotence. Viola and 
Mainwaring discovered that the failures of authoritarian rule 
in Argentina since 1976 have improved the previously tarnished 
image of civilian government: "The disastrous results of the 
military broke that linkage, and at least for now there is a 
high tolerance of inefficiency and an acceptance of some 
restrictions."30 There appears to be a similar sense of 
tolerance in present day Peru. In 1968 the Peruvian military 
committed its reputation as an institution to the task of 
guiding the nation along a path of social justice and
28McClintock, 140.
29See: Scott Mainwaring and Eduardo Viola, "Transitions
to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," Journal of 
Interamerican Affairs 38 (Winter 1985) 193-219.
30Mainwaring and Viola, 218.
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prosperity. Although advances were made in the area of social 
justice, the military failed to bring sustainable prosperity 
to Peru. The inability to resolve these problems damaged the 
image of the military as being an efficient and responsible 
national institution. As a result, military rule has lost its 
attractiveness— at least for the time being.
Conclusion
Remmer admits that the five factors which she identifies 
vary in their significance from case to case. In assessing 
the strength of each of these factors in relation to the 
experiences of the Peruvian docenio. it becomes apparent that 
some of Remmer's factors are very important while others are 
largely irrelevant. The duration of the regime, high 
electoral growth, and a lack of party system stability have 
contributed to discontinuity between Peru's pre- and 
postauthoritarian democracies. The military's efforts to 
mobilize support for the regime were not altogether 
successful, yet resulted in a widening of the political 
spectrum and the growth of leftist parties. In a general 
sense, organizations like SINAMOS and the Comunidades 
Industriales were meant to provide the military with a 
corporatist style base of support but ended up politicizing 
the rural and urban working classes instead. The use of 
repression as a factor leading to change in Peru tends to be 
neutralized by its lack of distinction in comparison with
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previous authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, a strong 
case can be made for the absence of a stable party system 
before 1968. Strong party loyalties and the ability to make 
effective pacts between parties were not characteristics of 
the pre-docenio democracy. Remmer is correct in her 
assumption that had such traits been exhibited by a party 
system like Peru's, the chances of regime discontinuity would 
have been lessened.
Remmer leaves out three country-specific factors in her 
study which are crucial in explaining the causes of change in 
Peru: 1) The military leadership and politicking among the
officers played an important role in shaping the "revolution"; 
2) The institutional changes which the military initiated 
altered Peru's political landscape significantly; 3) The 
unique reformist character of the Velasco regime was 
influenced by issues brought forward by prominent Peruvian 
intellectuals. Their social commentary called for the 
economic, social, and political changes that lay at the heart 
of Velasco's reform efforts.
Remmer's thesis has merit, and does define some factors 
that have, indeed, affected Peru's struggle for democracy. 
However, because of the unorthodox nature of the Peruvian 
"experiment", it is also apparent that her comprehensive 
approach might be better applied to other recent cases of 
redemocratization in Latin America. Here lies the difficulty 
in applying Remmer's thesis to recently democratized Peru.
CONCLUSION
Remmer’s study attempts to bring together the key factors which 
affect returning democracies in Latin America. Having examined the 
literature on the subject of redemocratization it is readily apparent 
that very little attention has been paid to the causes of successful 
democratic consolidation. Most studies of redemocratization have 
focused on the types of transitions to democracy and the various 
reasons for the withdrawal of authoritarian rulers . The need for more 
studies like Remitter's, dealing with the factors which can strengthen 
returning civilian rule, is quite obvious. In this sense Remmer’s 
efforts are justly deserving of praise.
In an attempt to determine the effectiveness of her comprehensive 
approach, this thesis has brought Remmer's study down to the 
individual country level. The choice of the Peruvian docenio as a test 
case is reasonable, as Remmer would agree.1 The five factors which she 
identifies as key contributors to Pre- and Post-authoritarian regime 
discontinuity vary in their significance to the Peruvian case. Such 
factors as the degree of party system stability before the military 
intervention took place in Peru appear to be important. Of all of the
^aren Remmer, "Redemocratization and the Impact of 
Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," Comparative Politics 21 
(April 1985) 257.
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factors which Remmer has identif ied^the military ' s ability to mobilize 
support seems to play a crucial role in explaining the a shift to the 
left in Peru's political spectrum. Electoral growth and the duration 
of the docenio also added to the increased political strength of 
leftist parties in Peru. Although the use of repression by the 
military may provide a valuable explanation for discontinuities in the 
southern cone states, it does not do so in the case of Peru.
The weaknesses which can be seen in Remmer's approach are owing 
to her failure to account for country-specific factors. The uniquely 
reformist nature of the Peruvian military had a significant impact on 
Peru’s democratic party system. McClintock concludes that 
comprehensive studies of redemocratization are routinely hindered by 
this kind of problem: " . . .  unfortunately for those scholars who
aspire to comprehensive studies of redemocratization we must be 
sensitive to the increasing diversity and complexity of our cases."2 
The Peruvian docenio is a good example of how the unique and complex 
nature of a regime can play an important role in transforming the 
democratic party system, despite being ignored in Remmer’s thesis. 
In Brazil and Argentina, such features as greater economic prosperity 
and the absence of guerrilla movements may lead to democratic 
consolidation by means not available to Peru. The radical reform 
efforts of the Velasco regime may, in turn, result in an equally 
successful consolidation.
2Cynthia McClintock, "The Prospects for Democratic 
Consolidation in a ‘Least Likely’ Case," Comparative Politics 
(January 1989) 144.
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The future of Peruvian democratic institutions is still unclear. 
McClintock sees hope for the continuation of Peru's revitalized 
democratic system in spite of a growing problem with guerilla groups 
like Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru II. Using Remmer's ideas one can 
also make a somewhat optimistic prediction about Peru's political 
future. Remmer's five factors indicate a less substantial degree of 
change than is apparent when one examines this case more closely. 
Although Remmer provides a number of insights regarding the kinds of 
factors which might have an impact on redemocratization it should be 
noted that in the 1980s there is no single recipe for initiating 
changes leading to democratic consolidation.
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